2 Limits of Analysis: What We Don't Yet Know 7 --
Changing and Uncertain Nature of Force Ratios 15 --
Iraq's Misuse of Its Force Strength during the Fighting 18 --
Failures in Iraqi Leadership 19 --
Size and Nature of the Coalition Air Component 24 --
Land-based Air Defenses 32 --
Iraqi and Coalition Land Forces 36 --
Problem of Future Force Ratios 52 --
4 Course of the War and the Interaction of Joint Forces 57 --
Beginning of the Conflict: The Decapitation Strike and Initial Land Advance 58 --
Intensive Air Operations and Continuing Land Advances 62 --
Continuing Advance from the South 74 --
"Battle of Baghdad" 94 --
End of the Battle of Baghdad and Movement toward Tikrit 114 --
End of the Conflict and First Efforts at the Transition to Nation Building 125 --
5 Three Debates: War Plan and Transformation, "Powell Doctrine" Versus "Rumsfeld Doctrine," and The "New Way of War" 149 --
Political Factors That Make the "War Plan" Debate Largely Moot 153 --
Problem of Not Knowing the Detailed History and Nature of the "War Plan" 153 --
"New Way of War" Debate 159 --
"Powell Doctrine" versus "Rumsfeld Doctrine" Debate 163 --
6 Lessons About the Interaction Between Military Fundamentals and New Tactics and Technology 173 --
Value of Training, Readiness, and Human Factors 174 --
Competence, Adaptiveness, and Flexibility in War Planning 178 --
Synchronicity, Simultaneity, Speed, Jointness, and Combined Arms 180 --
Situational Awareness, Intelligence, and Command and Communications 183 --
Impact of Space Warfare 195 --
"Owning the Night" and "All-Weather Warfare" 202 --
Importance of Sustainability 203 --
Role of the Reserves 209 --
7 Lessons Affecting the Overall Conduct of the War and Joint Forces 215 --
Land Power-Reinforced Air Power and Vice Versa 216 --
Increased Tempo of Operations: Shock and Awe versus Precision and Focus 218 --
Netcentric Warfare, IS&R Technology, Processing, Integration, and Near-Real-Time Information Flow and Targeting 219 --
Broader Picture: The Need to Restructure U.S. Command and Control Systems and the Possible Need to Restructure Theater Commands 221 --
Asymmetric Warfare 231 --
Friendly Fire and Casualty Issues 238 --
Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2) System 240 --
Postwar Review of Force Plans, Basing, and Transformational Restocking 245 --
Broader Implications of Cutting Enemy Casualties and Collateral Damage: A New Dual Standard and Form of Asymmetric Warfare? 246 --
8 Air, Missile, and Land-Based Air Defense Forces 253 --
Effects-based Bombing: Fundamentally Changing the Effectiveness of Air Power While Limiting Civilian Casualties and Collateral Damage 256 --
True Precision Air-Strike Capability 276 --
In-Flight and Rapid Targeting and Retargeting: Time-Sensitive Strikes 280 --
Urban Close Air Support: A Reality under the Right Conditions 285 --
Value of Expeditionary Air Power and Problems in Allied Readiness, Interoperability, and Modernization 287 --
Changes in Air Combat Packages 289 --
Hard-Target Kill Capabilities 290 --
Use of Precision Air Munitions 294 --
Problem of Cluster Munitions 299 --
Bomber and the Advantage of Range-Payload 300 --
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) 307 --
Strengths and Weaknesses of the A-10 316 --
Strengths and Weaknesses of the A-64 Apache and Other Attack Helicopters 317 --
U.S. Marine Corps AV-8B Harrier 333 --
U.S. Marine Corps V-22 Osprey 335 --
Suppression of Enemy Air Defense (SEAD) 335 --
Role of the Patriot 338 --
9 Lessons Affecting Army Land Forces 349 --
Value of Main Battle Tanks and Heavy Firepower and Armor 351 --
"Precision Artillery" as a Partner to "Precision Air Power" 358 --
Special Forces as an Element of Joint Warfare 362 --
Urban Land Warfare 365 --
Research and Re-research on Local Weather and Operating Conditions 368 --
Problem of Allied Power Projection, Interoperability, and Allied War-Fighting Capability 368 --
10 Lessons Affecting Marine Corps Land Forces 373 --
Marines: Both "Post-Amphibious" and "Post-Littoral" Forces 374 --
Detailed Lessons from Marine Forces: Friction and the Continuing Fog of War 375 --
Lessons from the Combat Assessment Team Report for the Marine Corps Systems Command 381 --
Lessons from Field Reporting from the 1st Marine Division 388 --
Marine Corps Artillery 393 --
Marine Corps Supply and Logistics 395 --
11 Lessons Affecting Naval Forces 399 --
Jointness in Naval Air Operations 400 --
Jointness in C3, IS&R, and "Open Architecture" 401 --
Cruise Missile Ships 401 --
Mine Warfare and Naval Raids 401 --
Value of Sealift and Maritime Pre-Positioning Ships 402 --
12 Lessons Relating to Intelligence and Weapons of Mass Destruction 405 --
Intelligence Strengths and Weaknesses 405 --
Need for Better Assessment, Characterization, and Location of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Key Delivery Systems 407 --
Politics of Characterizing and Targeting Iraqi WMD Capabilities and Delivery Systems 431 --
Need for Rapid and Reliable Characterization of Chemical and Biological Agents and the Coalition Intelligence Effort 447 --
Organized Searches for Weapons of Mass Destruction in Proliferating Countries: The Search during and after the War 450 --
Lessons for the Future 455 --
Role of Women in Combat 471 --
Military Medical Facilities and Capabilities 471 --
14 Lessons from Iraqi Problems and Shortcomings 475 --
Iraq Really Was a Tyranny 476 --
Iraq Had Rival Politicized, Bureaucratic, and Compartmentalized Forces 476 --
Wasting the Best Forces Wastes All the Forces 479 --
Problem of Sanctions and Equipment Modernization 481 --
Iraqi Wartime Preparations Emphasized the Wrong Ideology and Type of Psychological Operations 482 --
Iraqi Command and Control: A Blind Force as Well as One without a Brain 483 --
Iraqi Irregular Warfare Tactics: Unexpected but More an Irritant Than Effective 483 --
Iraq Failed to Use Its Weapons of Mass Destruction If It Had Them 484 --
15 Lessons Regarding the Value of Allies and Build-Up Time 487 --
Allies and Interoperability 487 --
Value of Regional Allies 490 --
Value of Rebuilding Alliances 491 --
16 Military Lessons Relating to Conflict Termination, Peacemaking, and Nation Building 493 --
Impact of Limited Military Resources 494 --
Avoidable Problems 496 --
A Failure of U.S. Leadership and Organization 504 --
Inability of the U.S. Military to Properly Conceptualize and Understand Grand Strategy 506 --
There Is No "New Way of War" without Successful Conflict Termination, Peacemaking, and Nation Building 508 --
Intelligence on Conflict Termination and Nation Building 509 --
Lessons Relating to Political, Diplomatic, and Psychological Warfare 511 --
Overall Importance of Conflict Termination as a Critical Part of War Fighting 515 --
17 Grand Strategy: the Civilian Aspects of Nation Building and the Challenge of Winning the Peace 517 --
Short-Term Challenges and the Risk of Guerrilla War 517 --
Nation Building versus Guerrilla Warfare: Best, Worst, and Probable Cases 519 --
Lessons for Near-Term Action 524 --
Medium-Term and Longer-Term Challenges in Nation Building 527 --
Fracture Lines in the Postwar Infrastructure 529 --
Political Fracture Lines 536 --
Demographic Fracture Lines 542 --
Economic Fracture Lines 542 --
Energy and Oil Export Fracture Lines 544 --
Transparency and Conspiracy Theories 551 --
New Fracture Lines Caused by Disarmament and the Need to Rebuild Iraqi Military Forces 551 --
Lessons for Peacemaking and Nation Building 555 --
18 Grand Strategy: the Outcome of the Iraq War and the New Old Middle East 559 --
An Example of What? 559 --
Israel and the Second Intifada 561 --
Saudi Arabia and the Southern Gulf States 565 --
Islamic Extremism and Terrorism 568 --
U.S. Role and Presence in the Region 568 --
Energy Imports and Energy Security 569 --
Underlying Factors That Shape the New Old Middle East 570.
